The Republican Revival and Racial Politics by Bell, Derrick & Bansal, Preeta
The Republican Revival and Racial
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Derrick Bellt and Preeta Bansaltt
Harlem in the late 1930's remained locked in the hard times of the Great
Depression. The earlier desperation had given way to a silent struggle for
survival. During a quiet moment on a too-crowded block, an old, black man
sat on his front stoop observing familiar activities of the community he served
as respected sage. His wisdom, distilled during a long, hard life, dictated a
pragmatism that bordered on cynicism.
He listened now to the earnest young street worker, an exile from the upper
class, extolling the marvels of the Marxist millennium that would eventually
replace the agony and travail of capitalist oppression. The old man had
heard it all before, but he was patient as the young man harangued him
about the brave, new, benefit-filled world that would come sooner if only black
people would rise up and throw off their economic chains. When the young
proselytizer finished, the black man said he had only one question.
"Ask me anything, Pop," the young radical urged. "I have the answers to
all your people's problems."
"Well," asked the old man, "when you revolutionaries take power and
change all the world over-will you still be white?"
For the old man in this story, as for all black Americans, experience-
based skepticism1 counsels caution whenever young radicals urge them to
add the suspect symbol of communism to the stigma that color confers
automatically and indelibly on African Americans. Blacks remain neither
hostile to nor enthusiastic about the prospects of a Marxist world, but
absolutely nothing that young militants might say can alter a truth made
clear by a long history during which whites' determination to maintain a
dominant position over blacks has been the unchanging constant of Ameri-
can life.
Skepticism is the necessary response for people of color who grapple
with Frank Michelman's and Cass Sunstein's new republican concepts.
And "grapple" is an apt word, because the writings of both scholars are
dense with discussions of a character that only political philosophers can
translate. Neither writer is an earnest, young proselytizer; neither is a
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
-i Harvard Law School, Class of 1989.
1. See generally Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 297 (1987) (legal reformers too often have dismissed cavalierly authentic experiences of black
Americans).
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Marxist. Rather, they are two legal scholars whose works justify the re-
spect and reputations they enjoy. And yet in reading their essays, black
Americans may struggle to find reasons to allay their skepticism about the
Michelman-Sunstein jurisprudential millennium, a world in which the
positive aspects of classic republicanism and antifederalist thought would
be resurrected, freed of the racism and elitism that marked their
beginnings.
At first blush, the idea of reviving republicanism is appealing. Indeed,
the concept of rediscovering the "disinherited" tradition in American
thought2 is one that can never be completely repugnant to blacks strug-
gling to carve out a space in the nation's political imagination. The repub-
lican revival's initial appeal fades quickly, however. The federalist-anti-
federalist debate that occurrdd two centuries ago was, after all, a debate
from which blacks were excluded. Given that the antifederalist contingent
was led by Thomas Jefferson, a southern plantation slaveholder who in
many ways embodied the dichotomy between the founding fathers' ideals
of equality and their unrelenting protection of human "property," 3 how
can it be conceivable that the disinherited antifederalists had so much
more to offer to the struggles of black Americans than did the prevailing
liberal heirs?
Deeper reflection quickly reinforces history-based doubts. Republican-
ism, through its faith in the existence of shared values and the possibility
of a common good, assumes at base that a social consensus will emerge
from "reasoned" deliberation by individuals who think "rationally" and
who are capable of abstracting from their private experiences.4 For centu-
2. See Appleby, The American Heritage: The Heirs and the Disinherited, 74 J. AM. HiST. 198
(1987) (referring to antifederalist republican thought as the "disinherited" tradition in American con-
stitutional history).
3. In his Notes on the State of Virginia, written in 1781, Jefferson justifies slavery by advancing
his "suspicion only, that the blacks. . . are inferior to the whites in the endowments both of body and
mind." T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 138-39 (T. Abernathy ed. 1964). He
urged that eventual emancipation must be followed by colonization "to such place as the circumstances
of the time should render most proper." Id. at 132. Jefferson believed that if the legal barriers be-
tween the races were torn down, but no provision made for their separation, "convulsions" would
ensue which would "probably never end but in the extermination of the one or the other race." Id.
See generally J. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1765-1820, at
89-90 (1971) (discussing in detail Jefferson's paradoxical views on race).
4. Indeed, Professor Michelman himself seems to draw heavily upon the Kantian conception of
reason. See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26-27 (1986) [hereinafter Foreword]. The Kantian notion of
reason requires that there be public dialogue through which individuals may acquire self-cognition
and that a common good ultimately will be reached through each individual's ability to abstract from
her private experiences. "[If a law is to be morally valid . . . the ground of obligation here must
therefore be sought not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the world in which man is
placed, but must be sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason .... " I. KANT, GROUND-
ING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 2 (J. Ellington trans. 1981). The legal posture required by
such pure normative reason is impartiality or passionless objectivity-stances that have been labelled
distinctively white and distinctively male by several scholars. See, e.g., C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERFNT
VOICE (1982); C. MACKINNON, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 46 (1987); MacKin-
non, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 638
1610 [Vol. 97: 1609
Racial Politics
ries in this country, however, blacks have served as the group whose ex-
periences and private needs have been suppressed in order to promote the
"common good" of whites.5 Indeed, the "shared values" in which the anti-
federalists laid faith included a historically constant and (for whites) a
unifying belief in the inferior and subordinated position of black Ameri-
cans.' The ability of the founding fathers to suppress the injustices of the
black experience allowed them to arrive at a "common good" which toler-
ated (at best) and indeed sanctioned slavery. Such disregard for the actual
experiences of minority groups in this country made it possible a century
later for the Supreme Court to sanction racial segregation 7 and for the
Court's sole dissenter to decry the need for separate facilities because, as
he boasted, the white race is the dominant race in this country "in pres-
tige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power."'
Just as both the federalists and antifederalists took as a base assump-
tion the inherent justice and necessity of slavery, so also did policies of
racial domination underlie society's transitions from slavery to segregation
to desegregation.9 Despite the rhetoric of the current "equal opportunity"
era, society retains racial domination as a consensus ideology by promising
a nondiscriminatory present while simultaneously locking in the racial
disadvantages of our blatantly racist past.10 Indeed, racial reforms in law
(1983); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv.
543 (1986).
5. "Political democracy for the white man and racial discrimination for the black were often prod-
ucts of the same dynamics." C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CRow 7 (1955).
Thus, "[t]he determination of the Negro's 'place' took shape gradually under the influence of eco-
nomic and political conflicts among divided white people-conflicts that were eventually resolved in
part at the expense of the Negro." Id. at 53.
6. See Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in An-
tidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1371 (1988) (arguing that "stereotypes [about
Blacks] serve a hegemonic function by perpetuating a mythology about both Blacks and whites even
today, reinforcing an illusion of a white community that cuts across ethnic, gender, and class lines").
7. See Michelman, Foreword, supra note 4, at 31 ("[OQnly in sedulous abstraction from concrete
experience could 'separate' have seemed 'equal.' ").
8. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 558 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
9. Even though individuals have become labelled as equals within American egalitarian ideology,
hierarchy attaches no longer to defined social group roles, but to "somatic characteristics, physiog-
nomy, colour of the skin, 'blood."' L. DUMONT, HoMo HIERARCHicus: THE CASTE SYSTEM AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS 263 (G. Weidenfeld trans. 1970). In fact:
It is obvious on the one hand that society did not completely cease to be society, as a hier-
archized whole, on the day it willed itself to be simply a collection of individuals. In particular,
the tendency to make hierarchical distinctions continued. . . .[R]acism fulfills an old function
under a new form. It is as if it were representing in an egalitarian society a resurgence of what
was differently and more directly and naturally expressed in a hierarchical society. . . .Socie-
ties of the past knew a hierarchy of status bringing with it privileges and disabilities, amongst
others the total juridical disability of slavery. . . .The distinction between master and slave
was succeeded by discrimination by White against Black. . . .[B]y suppressing [the master-
slave distinction] the transformation of its racial attribute into racist substance was encouraged.
Id. at 262-63.
10. See Crenshaw, supra note 6, at 1384 ("The narrow focus of racial exclusion-that is, the
belief that racial exclusion is illegitimate only where the 'White Only' signs are explicit-coupled
with strong assumptions about equal opportunity, makes it difficult to move the discussion of racism
beyond the societal self-satisfaction engendered by the appearance of neutral norms and formal inclu-
sion."); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
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reflect less a late-blooming civic virtue than perceived changes in self-
interest by a society tardily willing to acknowledge the evils of slavery and
segregation." How, then, can blacks feel anything but skepticism and
cynicism when well-intentioned legal academics ask them to rely on a the-
ory that extols the shared values of a deliberative democracy?
Republicanism's revival of the notion of a common good is not, how-
ever, the only frightening prospect that the theory presents to black Amer-
icans. Republicanism's exaltation of "active citizenship" contains the seeds
of teleology and hierarchy in its implicit suggestion that some human
roles-most notably, the role of the human being as citizen-are more
true to the essence of humanity than are others. The virtuous citizen,
however, can only be free to pursue his human essence through civic par-
ticipation and through the life of the mind by having the luxury of mate-
rial independence. 2 "Civic" societies in Athens and in early America ef-
fected this luxury in part by creating a subclass of humans who tended to
the citizen's needs of the flesh and who were thereby excluded from the
realm of public dialogue."3 In nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
America, the citizen's need for material independence manifested itself
simply in the de jure or de facto exclusion from political participation of
those who were incapable of or unwilling to abstract from their private
experiences and material context and who hence were regarded as unvir-
tuous.' 4 Indeed, regardless of the epoch, any attempt to define human es-
sence or to posit a notion of the common good historically has resulted in
hierarchy, exclusion, and alienation. 5 Given the oppressive roots of re-
publicanism, blacks cannot help but wonder how judicial standards, al-
tered by Michelman's and Sunstein's updated principles of civic virtue
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (extension of formal rights to
blacks ultimately has legitimized remaining racial inequality).
11. See Book Note, 101 HARv. L. REV. 849, 850 (1988) (reviewing D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED (1987)) ("[Bell's] chronicles serve as powerful, poetic reminders that . . . [w]hen blacks seek
recognition of rights that do not also serve the interests of whites, the ambivalent foundations of
whites' commitment to equality and individual rights become exposed.").
12. Historically, the granting of the franchise has been contingent on the freehold. Individuals not
having the luxury of material independence have been viewed as "corrupt"; because such individuals
are subject to the will of another for existence, republican theory has held them to be incapable of
abstracted, normative reason. See J. PococK, Civic Humanism and Its Role In Anglo-American
Thought, in POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 80,
87-89 (1973).
13. See THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 108 (E. Barker trans. 1971) (the best state will not make
slaves and mechanics citizens, since they are merely "necessary conditions" and not "integral parts" of
the body politic). For a modern analysis of the division between the public realm of civic virtue and
the private realm of affective and economic association, see Olsen, The Family and the Market: A
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
14. The restrictions on the franchise-based on economic status, race, and gender-were origi-
nally the means by which a republic ensured that its citizens were virtuous. See supra note 12.
15. See K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 250 (3d ed. 1950) ("It is held, then, that
there exists a Common Good, the obvious beacon light of policy, which is always simple to define and
which every normal person can be made to see by means of rational argument. There is hence no
excuse for not seeing it and in fact no explanation for the presence of people who do not see it except
ignorance-which can be removed-stupidity and anti-social interest.").
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and deliberative democracy, can improve the legal status of the nation's
disadvantaged in general and of black people in particular. What parts of
the republican vision are capable of combatting and subduing the by-now
familiar priorities for whites in racial policymaking, priorities that have
preserved for whites their perpetual power?
Racial hypersensitivity? Perhaps. But American history has taught
blacks that they must question how any newly-proposed scheme of politi-
cal enlightenment is likely to affect them. They have learned by necessity
to be wary of the rhetorical seductions of such theoretical schemes, having
seen them time and again serve to exclude blacks from any significant
share of improvements to the "common good." Much of the republican
revival sounds pleasing to the intellectual ear, but, rather obviously, con-
temporary developments in the political law of race, as well as their his-
toric antecedents, have failed to satisfy the demands of intellectual honesty
or even logical consistency.16 The Court's decisions in McCleskey v.
Kemp1" and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education18 serve to remind us
of this point.
Clearly Professors Sunstein and Michelman are deeply devoted to the
American legal system-even as they lament its crushing historical de-
fects. They put their considerable intellectual prowess to the task of sur-
veying antifederalist thought, and from that survey they labor to piece
together from myriad sources the innovative jurisprudential schemes they
optimistically recommend. Yet black Americans are left wondering, not
without sadness, whether those who, even a half-century later, share the
old man's skepticism about the society's willingness to act out of virtue
rather than self-interest, can ever understand, much less join, the
Michelman-Sunstein commitment to making the world better by fashion-
ing new principles out of elements traceable to the ideas and ideals of
some of the framers. This is not too extravagant a concern or too unrea-
sonable a skepticism. After all:
What is the mentality of a people that could continue for over 300
16. Twentieth-century notions of human personality have shed light on racism by repudiating the
notion that the human mind is governed by exclusively rational or logical impulses. See J.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 251 (1976) (absence of common good ca-
pable of being rationally derived "will introduce rifts on questions of principle which cannot be recon-
ciled by rational argument because ultimate values-our conceptions of what life and society should
be-are beyond the range of mere logic"); see also S. FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID (J. Riviere
trans., J. Strachey ed. 1960); G. LEBON, THE CROWD (1960).
17. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Rejecting evidence of a massive statistical study showing that blacks who
murder whites in Georgia are 4.3 times more likely to receive death sentences than are defendants
charged with killing blacks, the Supreme Court in McCleskey insisted on proof that the state had
intended to discriminate against individual defendants. See generally Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp:
Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988).
18. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) In Wygant, the plurality held that the presence of prior employment
discrimination did not provide constitutional justification for a government entity to use a program of
race-conscious layoffs in its collective bargaining agreement.
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years to kidnap an estimated 50 million youth and young adults
from Africa, transport them across the Atlantic with about half dy-
ing unable to withstand the inhumanity of the passage, and enslave
them as animals? .. . What was the mind set of European-
Americans as they encountered native Americans who were basically
friendly to them, yet the European-Americans proceed to annihilate
almost the entire race and/or force them onto reservations, stealing
their land, and making themselves the heroes and the victims savage
villains. What can be understood about the world view of a people
who claim to be building a democracy with freedom and justice for
all, and at the same time own slaves and deny others basic human
rights?19
Admittedly, Professors Michelman and Sunstein recognize the histori-
cally dubious roots of the doctrine they seek to rejuvenate. Nevertheless,
Professor Michelman assures us that we need not fear republicanism's
"sometime historical connection with an obnoxiously solidaristic social
doctrine."20 In order to tap what he views as the "visionary resources" of
republican thought, Professor Michelman warns in stirring terms that
American liberals should fear more "a constitutional jurisprudence that
debases the community by slighting its self-transformative capacity and
abets the community's self-betrayal through lapse of commitment to ex-
tension of membership to persons who, at many historical moments, could
not count themselves heirs to traditions whose meanings did at those times
involve the exclusion or subordination of just those persons.121
Surely, this is an elegant statement of the problem. But in the equally
elegant discussions of government processes that follow, there seems to be
little persuasive evidence that the reformation of republicanism will offer
greater protection for the nation's "others" than now exists. Although
Professors Michelman and Sunstein promote a vision of constitutional ju-
risprudence that is far from being racist and that in fact is more inclusive
of black Americans than is current judicial wisdom, they seem to eliminate
the elitist aspects of republican theory by clothing traditional liberal rights
discourse in republican terminology.
In reaching for "republicanism's deeper constitutional implications"22
to demonstrate the inclusive aspects of republican theory, Professor
Michelman urges us to recognize what republican theory can contribute to
resolving the tension that runs throughout American constitutional
thought-the tension between being a government of laws and a govern-
ment of men, between law-rule and self-rule. He seeks to avoid being
19. L. MYERS, UNDERSTANDING AN AFROCENTRIC WORLD VIEW: INTRODUCTION TO AN OP-
TIMAL PSYCHOLOGY 8 (1988).
20. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1496 (1988).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1495.
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caught between a rock and a hard place-between the Lochner judiciary's
rejection on the basis of transcendental rights of the popular majority's
attempts to legislate new notions of state obligation, and the Bowers
Court's deference (and enslavement) to the legislature's enunciations of
authoritarian law."3 Arguing that the Court in Bowers lapsed into "a
politics of self-denial" in order to avoid replicating the Lochner Court's
invalidation of "we the people's" attempts at self-government, he states
that the modern judicial stance of process neutrality represents the Court's
limited view of judicial role. This limited view seeks to effectuate self-rule
by deferring to "'the people's' self-enclosing tendency to assume their
own moral completion as they now are."2
Professor Michelman argues that since so many of the "sources and
channels of republican self-government and jurisgenerative politics"25 lie
in nongovernmental settings, the judiciary must not look exclusively to the
normative dialogue that occurs in legislatures in order to ascertain and
honor "we the people's" will. Instead, the judiciary must recognize that
various forms of public association-whether in the workplace or on the
street-provide citizens with the "direct experience of self-revisionary, di-
alogic engagement"2 and that full participation requires that the various
components of "citizenship" in these alternate spheres not be denied.
According to Michelman's republican constitutional theory, citizenship
consists not merely in enfranchisement within the state, but also includes
public respect for various features that are constitutive of self. When indi-
viduals' identities are disparaged or degraded publicly through law, these
individuals are in some way denied "admission to full and effective partic-
ipation in the various arenas of public life."2 7 By recognizing the need for
individuals to be granted full participation in all spheres of "potentially
transformative dialogue,"28 modern republicanism as a constitutional the-
ory thus avoids replicating the hierarchical and exclusive features of class-
ical republican thought. Instead, Michelman argues that the republican
revival allows the judiciary to "reach for inclusion of the other, of the
hitherto excluded-which in practice means bringing to legal-doctrinal
presence the absent voices of emergently self-conscious social groups."29
23. Professor Horwitz has applauded Professor Michelman's project, arguing that republican the-
ory presents a serious attempt to justify the retreat from the Lochner era on substantively progressive
grounds, and not merely on traditional judicial restraint grounds. Arguing that progressive retreat
presents a new notion of the neutral state (as compared to the "nightwatchman" state of Lochner, or
the paralyzed state and judicial apparatus of the modern era), he suggests that republican theory
reintroduces the oft-neglected normative and constitutive character of law and thereby bridges the gap
between naturalist and positivist conceptions of law. See Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in
American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987).
24. Michelman, supra note 20, at 1532.
25. Id. at 1531.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1533.
28. Id. at 1531.
29. Id. at 1529.
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Although the constitutional theory proposed by Professor Michelman
promises to expand participation in the various spheres of civil society to
traditionally disempowered and disenfranchised groups, it remains unclear
how this theory can be substantively inclusive without lapsing into one
person's liberal theory of prepolitical rights. Indeed, how can courts apply
republican principles in such a way that they are vigilant and sensitive to
the needs of blacks, homosexuals, and other minority groups with regular-
ity and commitment, and at the same time give effect to the constantly
political and revisionary activities of "we the people"? Claiming that it
avoids the Lochner Court's evisceration of democratic self-rule through
imposition of a notion of transcendental law, Professor Michelman's re-
publicanism cannot do without defining which aspects of individuals'
identities are more constitutive of self, or which groups are traditionally
silenced and disempowered. Indeed, in order to be inclusive, the republi-
can revival must establish certain baseline principles, such as defining
which groups traditionally have been excluded from the channels of main-
stream dialogue, that are not subject to continual revision by the outputs
of democratic politics. And yet, once courts establish principles for resolv-
ing which groups or which identity traits are more worthy of respect in
cases in which two or more interests come into conflict, the republican
revival loses its immanent quality and instead reimposes law-like criteria
by which courts judge the relative needs of various social groups.
Bowers is an easy case for demonstrating that Michelman's version of
republicanism can be inclusive. In Bowers, there was a clearly excluded
minority group that was disparaged by the popularly elected and sup-
ported legislature and that historically has been considered outside the
mainstream of civil society. It is therefore simple to identify homosexuals
as the "hitherto excluded" and to decry a law that would disparage their
identity and diminish their citizenship status in the various spheres of civil
society. In most modern cases, however, there is no defined "other" that
can be clearly identified as such without recourse to instinctive notions
based on personal context and experience. Indeed, most cases involve a
controversy between two parties, both of whom may represent groups that
are construed by some individuals as having been unduly silenced. In such
cases, courts applying revived republican theory will have to determine
which outcome will more likely deny an "excluded" group access to the
various spheres in which dialogic, self-revisionary activity takes place. For
example, in a rent control case, the court will be forced to decide whether
a statute forcing landlords to lower rents in certain dwellings furthers or
detracts from the possibility of critical, transformative dialogue among cit-
izens. On the one hand, such a statute would grant less wealthy individu-
als an essential prerequisite to full participation in civic society-a home
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through which they can affirm their identity and form an attachment."0
On the other hand, such a statute would deny a landlord the full enjoy-
ment of her property and make insecure the material base that grants her
the "independence" allowing her to participate fully and virtuously in
civic life."1 Rather than providing judges with a principled basis upon
which to decide controversies, then, the republican revival merely repro-
duces the tension that runs throughout American constitutionalism. In at-
tempting to make law more immanent and more responsive to the de-
mands of popular self-rule, republicanism cannot escape the need for
transcendence, consistent rules, and hence some measure of undemocratic
and arbitrary output. 2
30. Professor Radin has argued that personal property is constitutive of identity whenever individ-
uals form personal attachments to it or whenever the property has become identified with a person,
with her self-constitution in the context of her environment. In such cases, personal property cannot
be taken away and replaced with money or other things without harm to an individual's personhood,
to her identity and existence. See Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982).
Although a tenant's apartment is not "property" in the legal sense, it nevertheless may be the source
of great personal attachment. Under republicanism, therefore, a tenant's home necessarily would be
respected as a source of identity that could not be disparaged or denied without concomitant harm to
the tenant's full "citizenship." For an analysis of other examples of nonfungible noncommodities that
are integral to an individual's personhood, see generally Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1849 (1987). Clearly, multiplying the number of recognized nonfungible noncommodities or the
number of aspects constitutive of individuals' "personhcod" could complicate the republican task
greatly.
A rent control statute would promote the republican vision by providing a means for extending the
material independence necessary for citizenship to impoverished tenants. Critical to republican theory
and active citizenship throughout history has been the recognized need for individuals to be allowed
certain material prerequisites, such as a home and the means for subsistence, that grant them the
independence necessary for virtue. Although republics historically have met this requirement of mate-
rial independence by excluding from the franchise any individuals not having possession of a freehold,
see supra note 12, "revived" republicanism proposes a more inclusory strategy in which periodic
redistributions of wealth ensure that individuals are guaranteed the material prerequisites of indepen-
dence. See Michelman, Possession v. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L.
REV. 1319 (1987). Of course, this strategy replicates the central dilemma underlying constitutional-
ism; it cannot answer the question of how periodic, collective reimaginations and redistributions of
wealth are to take place without upsetting the property "rights" of those who depend upon them for
material independence. See infra note 31.
31. The republican need for securing material independence to ensure virtuous citizenship thwarts
the republican attempt to dismantle legal rights as artificial constraints on political freedom. Indeed,
republicanism is forced to choose between its dual necessities-granting material independence and
the means for citizenship to all individuals (e.g., making apartments more accessible to tenants and
granting other forms of economic benefit) on the one hand, and securing material independence for
existing citizens (e.g., securing a steady stream of adequate rents) on the other. Therefore, in its
attempt to escape "law-likeness" and property "rights" by making existing distributions of property
more inclusive through collective revision, republicanism cannot deny the need for some established
"minimum" property right that remains outside the realm of political revision. Cf. F. HAYEK, Taxa-
tion and Redistribution, in THE CONsTrrurrON OF LIBERTY 306 (1960) (doubting that progressive
tax schedule, despite its law-like formality, could ever be removed from realm of politics and placed
into realm of law).
This is not to deny that a similar tension besets the liberal vision. On the one hand, liberals seek
the restraint on politics and the "law-likeness" that a transcendental notion of property rights symbol-
izes, yet liberals also need to accept the necessity of modifying (periodically) property entitlements in
order to achieve their vision of equality. See J. NEDELSKY, PROPERTY VS. DEMOCRACY: THE ORI-
GINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITTIoN (forthcoming 1988). Pointing out the
property rights tension in republican thought does demonstrate, however, that republicanism cannot
escape the same dilemmas that beset liberal constitutional thought.
32. In its repudiation of rights and legal rules as abstracted and alienated forms of authority,
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In seeking the republican revival, however, Professor Michelman him-
self seems to acknowledge the need for something more than pristine logic
enhanced by reconsidered history. So, after a lengthy excursion through
the complexities of republican theory's contribution to "self-rule as law-
rule," "jurisgenerative politics," and innumerable discussions of modern
pluralist political science, he concedes that republican theory's main value
lies in its aspirational content."3 Recognizing that judicial invalidations of
majoritarian politics result in legal rules that, although inclusive, are con-
trary to actual popular democracy, Professor Michelman nevertheless as-
serts that even a countermajoritarian manifestation of the republican revi-
val can contribute greatly to political freedom and self-government.
Through dialogue and critical self-reflection, judicial panels applying re-
publican principles can replicate the normative conversations occurring on
the streets and in town councils, thereby enabling the judiciary to become
"a bastion of (its own) self-government" that assumes as one of its
"ascribed functions the modeling of active self-government that citizens
find practically beyond reach."3 Even while invalidating the outputs of
popular sovereignty, the judiciary therefore can, according to Michelman,
produce "law's republic," which creates the freedom for individuals to as-
sume full participation in alternative spheres of social life and public
dialogue.
According to Michelman, law's republic recognizes the voices from the
revived republicanism draws significantly from the Marxist critique of rights. See K. MARX, On the
Jewish Question, in EARLY WRITINGS 211 (R. Livingstone & G. Benton trans. 1975). Such a repudi-
ation also mirrors the mode of analysis used by legal scholars associated with Critical Legal Studies.
See, e.g., Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves,
62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984) (legal rights reproduce hierarchy and "legalize" alienation); Tushnet,
An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363 (1984) (rights are indeterminate and cooptive
abstractions).
33. In fact, in rhetorically questioning the possibility of jurisgenerative politics, Professor
Michelman argues that republican constitutionalism may be possible "either not at all (that is, its
possibility depends on false or incredible assumptions about social facts), or only on conditions of
social ordering or control that are too onerous or repellent to accept. Such a demonstration I would
regard as neither a refutation of this essay nor a sign of its failure; if republican constitutionalism isn't
possible for us then it isn't, and we may as well know plainly on what rock our ship has for some
time been foundering." Michelman, supra note 20, at 1506.
His project thus resembles that of Karl Polanyi, who observed that "the inevitable result of the
liberal philosophy, which claims that power and compulsion are evil, [is] that freedom demands their
absence from a human community. No such thing is possible; in a complex society this becomes
apparent." K. POLANYI, supra note 15, at 257. Recognizing the futility of seeking freedom from
actual or alienated authority in a complex world, therefore, Polanyi in the end clings to the same faith
that has motivated the struggle of black Americans for centuries and that ultimately captures Profes-
sor Michelman's republicanism.
[Man] resigns himself, in our time, to the reality of society which means the end of that
freedom. But, again, life springs from ultimate resignation. Uncomplaining acceptance of the
reality of society gives man indomitable courage and strength to remove all removable injustice
and unfreedom. As long as he is true to his task of creating more abundant freedom for all, he
need not fear that either power or planning will turn against him and destroy the freedom he
is building by their instrumentality. This is the meaning of freedom in a complex society; it
gives us all the certainty that we need.
Id. at 258B.
34. See Michelman, Foreword, supra note 4, at 74.
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margin and seeks to include them in the conversation at the center. It
seeks to make real the ideals of political freedom not by responding to
"talismanic invocation of [popular] authority" but rather by fashioning
democratic and inclusive rules out of the "cognizable normative universe"
in which justice to individual parties is as valued as is the notion of popu-
lar sovereignty. 5 Although Michelman recognizes that this brand of judi-
cial self-government runs in tension with actual democracy, still, "[t]hat
difficulty, too, must yield (if at all) to a pragmatic consideration: Actual
democracy is not all there is to political freedom, and Hardwick is before
us, appealing to law's republic."36
Unable to find a principled basis for resolving disputes under the broad
aims of republican theory, Professor Michelman thus is constrained in the
end to rely on faith in the judiciary's ability to hear voices from the mar-
gin. Yet bringing content to the inclusive, democratic promises of Ameri-
can constitutionalism-indeed, to those elements of political freedom that
popular sovereignty cannot be relied upon to produce-requires not so
much intellectual understanding as an abiding faith able to weather politi-
cal perfidy and judicial betrayal. Relying on that faith, blacks for decades
have sought the ideal of equality even while acknowledging the accuracy
of academics who in recent years have proclaimed the indeterminacy of
that ideal. Recognizing that constitutional rights have never translated
into literal mandate for white leaders responding to black demands for
equality, blacks nevertheless have clung to the Constitution as an embodi-
ment of the ideals of freedom and equality for all:
[I]t is also true that blacks always believed in rights in some larger,
mythological sense-as a pantheon of possibility. It is in this sense
that blacks believed in rights so much and so hard that we gave them
life where there was none before; held onto them, put the hope of
them into our wombs, mothered them, not the notion of them; we
nurtured rights and gave rights life. And this was not the dry process
of reification, from which life is drained and reality fades as the ce-
ment of conceptual determinism hardens round, but its opposite.
This was the story of Phoenix; the parthenogenesis of unfertilized
hope.
37
In appealing to "law's republic," Professor Michelman relies upon this
kind of faith in normative ideals and political struggle that blacks have
pursued in demonstrating the paradoxical opposition between "their situa-
35. Id. at 76.
36. Michelman, supra note 20, at 1537; see also Michelman, Foreword, supra note 4, at 73
("[F]reedom's connection to self-government does not lie only, or ultimately, in the protective function
of popular sovereignty, invaluable though that function is.").
37. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, in A LESS
THAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 56
(J. Lobel ed. 1988).
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tion and its relation to our (and increasingly their) Constitution." 8 Rely-
ing on the judiciary's ability to hear voices from the margin and to fashion
an inclusory strategy granting citizens full access to the arenas of social
life, he asks rhetorically, "does anyone doubt the primary and crucial role
in this instance of the emergent social presence and self-emancipatory ac-
tivity of Black Americans . . .[that has] left its clear imprint on constitu-
tional law both within and beyond the topical area of race[]?" ' In so
asking, Michelman demonstrates that he, like generations of black Ameri-
cans, recognizes the defects in our democracy and yet remains motivated to
sift through the ashes of our political and jurisprudential past for rem-
nants of what might have been and, in his view, what might yet be. This
is what the Michelmans and Sunsteins in our midst know, and who can
say that their vision is flawed beyond all feasibility? Certainly not the old
man of the story, nor those black people who recognize that their survival
depends on making real the ideals that are so frequently espoused in this
society and so little observed. Skepticism about the republican ideal would
stem less from disbelief than from concern that too often coalitions forged
in the name of improved government are wrought through compromises
that sacrifice participation by blacks.40 That is the inescapable-and
seemingly unchangeable-pattern of this country's political and judicial
functioning.
Having Professors Michelman and Sunstein join blacks in the quest to
make real the ideals and aspirations of American democracy through
abiding faith in the judiciary is not a negligible contribution on their part.
By gross definition, they both are members of the oppressor class. They
are, however, obviously aware of the oppression their society imposes by
color and class-based fiat. Indeed, the essays are their offering to the
struggle, exercises in scholarship that are reflections of their concern and,
perhaps, manifestations of their faith.
Inadequate? Probably, given the logic-defying barriers of power-based
precedent lurking just behind the dense smokescreen of race. But the op-
pressed will not triumph over these barriers through faith alone. And
those slender reeds that are accepted as "black progress" cannot emerge
without the nurture of some whites who realize that the oppression of
blacks does not oppress blacks alone, but, indeed, that it denies all of hu-
manity the full emancipatory potential of critical, dialogic self-rule. Thus,
while the current interest in civic republicanism may be a passing fashion
for those with the luxury to revel in the life of the mind, the skepticism
that is a necessary defense for the perpetually disadvantaged should not
blind minorities to the possibility that faith in the intellectual solution
38. Michelman, supra note 20, at 1530.
39. Id.
40. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW § 1.9 (2d ed. 1980) (The Principle of Invol-
untary Sacrifice).
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may be as deserving of recognition as faith that our humanity will not
always be subordinated because we are not white.

